BEPA monthly brief, Issue 44, February 2011 by Missiroli, Antonio et al.
 
 
Editor: Antonio Missiroli (Tel. 84147) 
Coordinator: Isabelle Ioannides  
(Tel: 87407) 
Assistant: Aurélie Therace  
(Tel. 64925) 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in 
the BEPA Monthly do not necessarily 
reflect those of the European Commis-
sion. 
 
1 
bepa monthly brief 
February 2011 – Issue 44 
EDITORIAL 
By Antonio Missiroli 
 
Implementing Lisbon: 
changes and challenges  
 
It is not unusual for international 
treaties to be affected by… climate 
change. A recent example was the 
1998 Rome Treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court: the 
general “spirit” in which the 
negotiations were first launched and 
later finalised evaporated just a 
couple of years after its signature, 
a f fect ing  both the  t reaty ’ s 
implementation and its overall 
impact. 
It is even less unusual for European 
treaties to undergo a similar destiny. 
The Maastricht Treaty, for instance, 
entered into force almost two years 
after its original signature. In the 
meantime, the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) crisis had 
dramatically broken out, changing the 
entire context in which EMU had been 
planned and eventually agreed. On top 
of that, Yugoslavia had irremediably 
broken down, changing the whole 
framework in which the CFSP had 
been conceived and accepted.  
The Lisbon Treaty is a quintessential 
case of such political climate change. 
Its most innovative bits were 
essentially agreed upon in 2003 
(between the final stages of the 
Convention on the Future of 
Europe and the preliminary ones of 
the ensuing Intergovernmental 
Conference) and were f irst 
incorporated in the ill-fated 
Constitutional Treaty.  
The repeated setbacks at national 
level that have marked the 
ratification process ever since have 
p a r t i a l l y  d i l u t e d  b u t  n o t 
fundamentally altered the substance 
of the initial arrangements. What has 
definitely changed since the 2001 
Laeken Declaration that (re)launched 
the EU institutional reform process, 
however, is the political climate in 
which the new provisions have been 
(and are still being) put in place. 
This is even more true of the 
broader EU political agenda. Little 
more than one year after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
overall picture has radically changed 
– both in Europe and worldwide – 
and further tectonic shifts may still 
be under way. First came the 
shocking experience of the 
December 2009 Copenhagen 
Conference on (real) climate change, 
where an ambitious EU found itself 
sidelined and incapable of getting its 
message across. Then the sovereign 
debt crisis prompted by Greece’s 
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fiscal problems and aggravated by Ireland’s 
banking troubles hit the entire euro zone, 
highlighting the shortcomings and the unfinished 
business of Maastricht-style EMU – which were 
only marginally addressed by Lisbon. And now, 
of course, the events in the Southern 
Mediterranean. 
Lost in translation? 
Last but not least, the very nature and contents 
of the new treaty required additional negotiations 
both among the Member States and between 
EU institutions. That was certainly the case with 
the establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the broader 
reorganisation of EU external action, but it 
became soon apparent also for other provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Its actual implementation, 
in other words, is proving at least as important as 
its initial negotiation and ensuing ratification. 
Combined with the changed political climate – in 
Brussels as well as the 27 capitals – this may well 
translate into unexpected outcomes and produce 
unintended consequences. 
Needless to say, the climate may change again. 
The severe pressure under which the Union is 
adapting its economic governance structures, for 
instance, may end up giving new impetus to the 
European integration process (and it is already 
prompting a new, if very limited, treaty change). 
This is why the full implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty is likely to take – and shape – the 
entire term of all the institutions currently 
involved in it. Perhaps only by 2013/14 will the 
dust settle and make both the formal set up and 
the actual modus operandi of the post-Lisbon 
EU fully legible.  
And this is also why the analysis of such 
implementation is bound to remain a challenge 
and a work in progress – like Sigmund Freud’s 
analysis, a potentially interminable one. 
This should not sound as an excuse for not 
undertaking it – on the contrary. The 
international high level conference on 
“Implementing the Lisbon Treaty”, organised on 
9-10 February by BEPA and the Commission’s 
Legal Service in cooperation with DG Education 
and Culture, was explicitly meant to be a first 
opportunity to tackle the thorny issues related to 
the translation of the new treaty provisions into 
new realities and to highlight actual and potential 
developments.  
President Barroso and a number of 
Commissioners and top EU officials took the 
floor to address them (their interventions can be 
found on BEPA’s website) and to animate a 
discussion that involved also academics, experts 
and think tankers from all over Europe.  
This issue of BEPA Monthly Brief tries to offer 
a bird’s eye view of the debate by revisiting the 
main themes addressed during the conference. In 
doing so, it resorts to the benchmarks suggested 
on the occasion by all those speakers (starting 
with the Commission’s President himself), who 
proposed to explore whether the Lisbon Treaty 
increases the Union’s institutional efficiency, its 
political legitimacy, and the coherence and 
visibility of its external action.  
The conference did not provide a conclusive 
answer – nor does, of course, this little Brief. 
The exploration, therefore, is to be continued, in 
the hope that the original “spirit” of Lisbon is 
not lost in transition. 
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Does the European Union (EU) suffer from a 
legitimacy deficit? Frustration with the EU’s 
standards and performance in terms of 
representation and accountability accompanied 
debates on European integration since at least 
the early 1990s. For many citizens, the Union is a 
distant bureaucratic apparatus that lacks the 
appropriate structures for democratic input. 
The steady fall in turnout at European elections, 
negative outcomes of EU referenda, limited 
recognition of the European Parliament’s (EP) 
democratic functions, or declining support for 
European integration are signs of public apathy 
and growing estrangement. 
As a consequence, there is a wide-spread 
awareness that tackling the EU’s democratic 
shortcomings is a condicio sine qua non for the 
success of the European project. Already in 2001 
the Laeken Declaration reflected this idea by 
stating that “the Union needs to become more 
democratic, more transparent and more 
efficient”. Efforts undertaken to achieve this 
goal have led to numerous reforms elaborated in 
the framework of the Constitutional Convention 
and introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.  
The new Treaty seeks to enhance democratic 
scrutiny at all levels by strengthening the EP, 
involving national parliaments, and empowering 
citizens. But will these reforms “cure” the 
legitimacy deficit as we know it? 
Strengthening the European Parliament 
The Lisbon Treaty has substantially strengthened 
the EP’s legislative, budgetary and nomination 
powers. In legislative terms, the Parliament has 
been put on an equal footing with the Council, 
with co-decision becoming the “ordinary 
legislative procedure”. In budgetary terms, 
Lisbon has given the EP full parity with the 
Council in approving all expenditures related to 
the annual budget. As for its nomination powers, 
the new Treaty has upgraded the MEPs rights in 
the (s)election of the Commission President. 
In the first 15 months since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament has 
demonstrated its readiness to flex its new muscles. 
In a display of power, MEPs rejected the 
SWIFT agreement with the US, pressed the 
Council for a greater say concerning the 
European External Action Service, and effectively 
compelled Commission President Barroso to 
enhance the EP’s powers in the framework of a 
new inter-institutional agreement. 
The assembly’s increased powers can – in theory – 
bridge the gap between the Union and its citizens. 
Given that the EP is the only EU institution with a 
direct popular mandate, it is reasonable to assume 
that more parliamentary authority would 
strengthen democratic accountability. 
Such arguments sound appealing. However, they 
have so far failed the reality test. The logic of 
expanding the EP’s powers in order to 
“democratise” the Union inspired all previous 
rounds of treaty revision. Yet the strengthening 
of the Parliament has only been matched by 
falling rates of citizen participation. Voter 
turnout at European elections has alone dropped 
from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009. So why 
should the result be better this time around? 
One effect might turn the tide: the Lisbon Treaty 
has the potential to increase the political ties 
between the Parliament and the Commission. 
The degree of interdependence is increasing, as 
more legislative proposals from the Commission 
require the EP’s approval and as the (s)election 
of the Commission President is more tightly 
linked to the outcome of European elections. 
With the Lisbon Treaty in place one can already 
sense a rapprochement between the Barroso II 
Commission and a strengthened, more self-
confident European Parliament. Linking the (s)
election of the Commission President to the 
outcome of EP elections could further increase 
the “strategic partnership” between both 
institutions. This would not only boost citizens’ 
interest in European elections and in the role of 
1 A cure for the EU’s legitimacy deficit?  
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the EP; it would also work to the advantage of 
the Brussels 'executive' by consolidating the 
political power base and popular legitimacy of 
the Commission, which has lost much of its 
strategic clout since the late 1990s.  
Involving national parliaments 
The Lisbon Treaty encourages national 
parliaments to get more involved in EU policy 
formulation, particularly by introducing the so-
called “yellow” and “orange card”. The new 
provisions create an early warning mechanism, 
which allows national assemblies to scrutinise 
any proposal for EU legislation in order to assess 
whether it abides by the subsidiarity principle. 
The stronger role bestowed on national 
parliaments could have a number of 
consequences at both national and European 
level. At national level, the “cards” offer 
parliaments – for the first time – an avenue to 
make their voice heard, distinct from that of 
their governments. The opportunity to exert ex-
ante control weakens their argument about being 
sidelined in the EU’s law-making process. 
Yet the new stipulations could overburden 
parliaments and have a negative impact on 
governments. In a number of Member States, 
the enhanced role of national parliaments could 
(further) limit the executive’s room for 
manoeuvre. Governments might be “obliged” to 
consult and coordinate more closely with their 
parliaments, which could indeed improve 
transparency but also restrict the executive’s 
autonomy. 
Most national assemblies are already struggling 
with their workload and the eight weeks allowed 
for filing a subsidiarity complaint raise the bar 
even higher. Despite some successful try-outs 
between 2005-2009, one still needs to question 
whether parliaments will in “real life” be able to 
effectively scrutinise a body of EU legislation. 
At European level, the stronger role for national 
parliaments could foster EU-wide debates and 
cooperation between national and European 
legislators. To make use of their new prerogatives, 
national parliaments and political parties will have 
to intensify cross-border cooperation. The latter 
could reinforce the ties between national and 
European parliamentarians.  
Summing up, one must note that the overall 
impact of both “cards” will become clearer only 
over time – insofar as they are actually used in 
practice, thus creating precedents and prompting 
responses. 
Empowering citizens 
Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty foresees 
more direct popular input by introducing the 
European citizens’ initiative (ECI), which aims 
to encourage citizens across Europe to mobilise 
in order to push the Union’s “legislative 
button”.  
In early 2011 the two co-legislators – EP and 
Council – adopted the rules for the 
implementation of the ECI, which strive to make 
the citizens’ initiative as “user-friendly” as 
possible. The regulation allows more than one 
million citizens from at least seven Member 
States to invite the Commission to submit a 
legislative proposal within the “framework of its 
powers” and for the “purpose of implementing 
the Treaties”. Member States have now one year 
to transpose the ECI regulation into national 
legislation, which means that the launch of 
citizens’ initiatives will most likely be possible 
from the beginning of 2012. 
The citizens’ initiative has attracted much 
interest from civil society organisations, NGOs 
and the media, and raised hopes that the new 
instrument could counter public disengagement 
with European affairs, stimulate transnational 
debates, promote the Europeanisation of 
national public discourse, and make citizens 
more aware of how the EU functions.  
The aforementioned functions could benefit 
the Union’s democratic legitimacy. However, 
there are a number of risks associated with 
that. First, some initiatives might mirror 
particular interests pushed by a well-organised 
minority rather than a general will of European 
citizens. It seems unlikely that “ordinary 
citizens” will employ the instrument. The 
European public will instead have to rely on 
intermediaries, such as NGOs, trade unions, or 
lobby groups. Policy-making could, as a result, 
fall pray to a “tyranny of minorities” backed by 
resourceful interest groups able to organise 
transnational initiatives. 
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Second, the new instrument might become a 
source of misunderstanding and frustration on the 
side of organisers and signatories. This could be 
the case a) if the Commission’s response does not 
match the expectations of the organisers and 
supporters of an initiative; b) if a legislative act 
proposed by the Commission is substantially 
amended or rejected by the EU’s co-legislators 
(EP and Council); and c) because it will take years 
for a successful initiative to be implemented. 
Bearing in mind both opportunities and risks, 
one should welcome the new instrument with a 
healthy dose of realism. The application of the 
citizens’ initiative will enrich the EU’s 
conventional participatory repertoire with a form 
of “advocacy democracy”, but it will neither alter 
the Union’s model of representative democracy 
nor substantially improve its quality.  
Put simply, the new instrument will not in and 
by itself contribute to overcoming the EU’s 
democratic deficit. It will not fundamentally 
increase the degree of politicisation in the EU or 
give European politics the lifeblood of a vibrant 
democracy, which ultimately thrives on the clash 
of opposing arguments and the personalisation 
of political conflicts. 
 
 
Too early to tell 
Only 15 months after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, it is still far too early to deliver a 
final verdict on whether the reforms will 
substantially contribute to making the Union 
more legitimate and more democratic in the eyes 
of citizens. But one thing seems clear: the 
strengthening of the EP, the enhanced 
involvement of national parliaments, and the 
introduction of more elements of direct 
democracy will not suffice to bridge the existing 
gap between the EU and its citizens. Boosting 
the Union’s “input legitimacy” is important. 
However, ordinary citizens (and elites!) will only 
appreciate and identify with the European 
project if the EU provides convincing evidence 
in everyday life. 
Ultimately, the Union will be judged on the 
output it generates, and Member States bear the 
main responsibility for making the “new EU” 
capable of providing the kind of returns which 
may convince citizens of its future added value. 
Only if national capitals are ready, willing and 
able to deliver will the innovations laid down in 
the Lisbon Treaty stand a real chance of 
effectively countering the EU’s legitimacy deficit.  
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The brand new European External Action 
Service (EEAS) has been up and running for two 
months now. While it is still sorting out a 
number of organisational and staffing issues, one 
can already set one of the key benchmarks by 
which the EEAS will have to be judged on its 
first anniversary: did it succeed in making 
EU external action more coherent? 
Key to the new body’s success will be 
coordination across policy fields and among the 
numerous actors at European and national levels. 
But it also means that High Representative/Vice-
President (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton must 
pursue a comprehensive approach to foreign 
policy and build up integrated structures within 
her new diplomatic corps. While this holds true 
in general, it will be particularly crucial in the 
field of crisis management and peacebuilding. 
And a first test for the EEAS ability to adopt a 
comprehensive approach will be Europe's 
response to the tectonic shifts currently shaking 
the Southern Mediterranean. 
Multi-dimensional coherence 
The Lisbon Treaty designed the EEAS as 
Europe’s operational hub for external relations 
and the High Representative as its chief 
coordinator and consensus-builder. To live up to 
this job description, Catherine Ashton must 
ensure coherence across several dimensions: 
functional (the various policy fields), institutional 
(especially between the EEAS and the European 
Commission), and political (between EU and 
national levels). For its part, the EEAS must 
create the structures and mechanisms to 
coordinate foreign and security policy with a 
large variety of other areas that have an external 
dimension: development, civil protection, trade, 
agriculture, energy, migration, internal security, 
and economic governance - to name just a few. 
But even within the specific realm of foreign 
policy, Catherine Ashton and the EEAS should 
take a more comprehensive approach. 
Specifically, the actions of all geographical and 
horizontal EEAS units, as well as the relevant 
Commission departments, should factor in 
human rights while dedicated structures (at 
EEAS headquarters as well as delegations 
abroad) must ensure that such mainstreaming 
actually takes place. The same goes for women’s 
rights and gender-related issues, which are 
pertinent to all aspects of foreign policy but have 
been neglected far too long. 
Such cross-policy coherence requires of course 
close cooperation between the EEAS and the 
Commission. As Vice-President of the college, 
Catherine Ashton is charged with coordinating 
all aspects of the Union’s external relations. For 
this, she must work closely with her fellow 
commissioners. At staff level, the EEAS must be 
included in the Commission’s inter-service 
consultations just as any other Commission DG. 
But institutional fixes alone will not do. 
Important hurdles to comprehensive thinking 
have been cultural barriers in the minds of 
European and national officials. EU foreign 
policy has long been hampered by turf wars and 
incomprehension between Commission, Council 
and national operators. Such problems must be 
overcome within the EEAS: in other words, the 
new service must swiftly create a common esprit 
de corps among its personnel. This will require, 
besides skillful leadership and appropriate 
incentives, common training for all EEAS 
officials. Such training, however, should also be 
open to Commission staff where appropriate. 
For a new gap has opened up over the past 
months: between the EEAS and the 
Commission. 
Leading Commission and EEAS representatives 
have sometimes competed for the limelight. 
Collaboration has been, at times at least, 
insufficient. What is more, the Commission has 
refused to transfer a number of civilian crisis 
response experts to the EEAS and moved them 
instead to an accounting office (the Foreign 
Policy Instruments Service), whose main task is 
the financial implementation of decisions taken 
2 External action: a more coherent and comprehensive approach 
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elsewhere. This approach should be reversed and 
the crisis response experts transferred to the 
EEAS – a move explicitly demanded by the 
European Parliament and the Council but 
ignored, so far, by the Commission. 
Singing from the same hymn sheet 
Getting things right in Brussels, however, will 
not be enough. Member States are used to 
defending their prerogatives in foreign affairs 
and will continue to carry out their own national 
policies. Catherine Ashton and the EEAS will 
have to ensure that this happens in a coordinated 
manner and that, on important issues, everybody 
sings from the same hymn sheet. Speaking with a 
single voice may not be a realistic expectation, at 
least at this stage, but conveying a clear, common 
and consistent message to the outside world (and 
also to our own citizens) seems a reasonable 
benchmark. 
One important instrument to this end will be 
the chairmanship of the Council’s foreign 
relations working groups, which bring together 
experts from the Member States and the 
Commission to prepare and coordinate most 
policy decisions. These groups are now chaired 
by EEAS officials selected by Catherine 
Ashton and no longer by the rotating Council 
presidency. The EEAS must make full use of 
this new role to deliver more “horizontal” 
coherence in external action. 
Council working groups in other domains, 
however, remain under the chairmanship of the 
rotating presidency, and they are becoming 
increasingly important also for external action. 
Catherine Ashton must find ways to tackle this 
problem, for instance by making sure that EEAS 
officials are represented in these groups 
whenever necessary. 
Crisis management and peace-building 
From an institutional point of view, the current 
crisis management and peace-building 
architecture is the weakest link in the EEAS. To 
tackle today’s security and humanitarian 
challenges, the EU needs integrated crisis 
prevention and response structures. The setting 
up of the EEAS offered a unique opportunity to 
overcome the institutional divisions that have 
often hampered effective EU crisis response and 
peace-building operations. 
What is needed is an integrated crisis 
management and peacebuilding department 
within the EEAS. This would bring together all 
relevant services and resources previously 
scattered across the Commission and the 
Council. It would be able to tackle the whole 
conflict cycle, from prevention and mediation to 
management and response proper, up to 
reconstruction and reconciliation. All necessary 
instruments and tools (diplomatic and 
operational, civil and military, CFSP- and 
Community-based) would be at the disposal of 
such an integrated department, while the distinct 
decision-making procedures in CFSP and 
Community matters would be fully respected. 
Such a department should be backed up by an 
EEAS crisis management board, bringing 
together its top brass, the Managing Director 
(MD) for crisis management and peacebuilding, 
the one responsible for global and multilateral 
issues (whenever appropriate), and the MDs and 
Special Representatives (EUSRs) for the regions 
affected by the crisis at hand. Unfortunately, this 
has not happened so far, and the EEAS has 
simply transferred under the same institutional 
umbrella the existing Commission and Council 
structures, without any significant change and 
clear organisational links between them. 
Additionally, as already mentioned, key crisis 
response experts are being kept out of the new 
service. 
A group of MEPs has repeatedly raised this issue 
with the EEAS leadership, who has replied that 
current structures are still provisional and are 
under review, with a possible redesign by May 
2011 already under consideration.  
This second chance to set up adequate structures 
to prevent and respond to the conflicts of the 
21st century should not be missed. And what is 
happening right now in the Southern 
Mediterranean will probably represent the first 
important test case for a better integrated 
EU policy and a comprehensive approach by the 
post-Lisbon Treaty structures. 
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If we apply to individual fundamental rights and 
their judicial protection the three parameters 
which have been the leitmotiv of the Conference, 
we see that the impact of the Lisbon Treaty in 
this field can be significant in terms of efficiency 
and political legitimacy. As for the Union’s visibility 
outside its borders, an important role can be 
played by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
This is all the more true if one looks at the 
EU accession to the European Charter of 
Human Rights, which offers a unique 
opportunity to achieve a coherent system of 
fundamental rights’ protection in 47 countries 
across Europe.  
Efficiency and legitimacy gains 
In the field of justice, efficiency and political 
legitimacy are strictly interconnected: the more 
efficient the European judicial system is at 
protecting the rights of individuals vis-à-vis 
EU acts, the more entitled the EU is to be 
considered as a system based on the rule of law 
in which the power of institutions is accountable 
and submitted to effective judicial control. 
The Lisbon Treaty improves the efficiency of 
judicial review in many aspects. It extends the 
full jurisdiction of the ECJ to the entire 
Freedom Security and Justice area. It gives the 
ECJ jurisdiction over CFSP when sanctions to 
individuals are at stake, and over its borders 
with other EU competences. It strengthens 
the judicial position of individuals claiming 
annulment of EU regulatory acts which are of 
direct concern to them and do not entail 
implementing measures. It allows accelerated 
procedures in preliminary rulings regarding 
persons in custody. And it speeds up 
infringement procedures in the event of non-
enforcement of ECJ rulings by Member 
States. 
The Lisbon Treaty also provides a new and 
stronger legal basis for the judicial protection of 
individuals in criminal matters. A further re-
organization of the Court has been envisaged in 
order to speed up proceedings, inter alia by 
extending recourse to accelerated procedures for 
certain cases. The ECJ has recently displayed 
also a tendency to leave the final decisions to 
national courts - in a sort of judicial subsidiarity. 
The Lisbon Treaty will increase the political 
legitimacy of the EU judicial system, too, since 
for the first time a panel of seven “wise 
men” (one of whom appointed by the European 
Parliament) will be heard on the nomination of 
new judges. Specialized courts will be established 
hereafter through ordinary legislative procedure, 
i.e. in co-decision with the EP.  
Such a decision has important political impli-
cations. It has been noted, in fact, that the 
creation of additional EU courts (for instance on 
taxation or state aid) does not necessarily entail a 
reduction of the length of proceedings, since 
appeals may slow down the process. Therefore, 
the establishment of new specialized courts 
within the EU judicial system should be 
proposed with great care, as should be the 
attribution of jurisdiction on preliminary rulings 
to any judge other than the Court of Justice. 
Chart(er)ed territory 
Justice is also an essential component of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which – by dint 
of Article 6 TEU – acquires the same legal value 
as the Treaties. The Charter consequently 
dictates judicial rules and guarantees (such as fair 
trial, right of defence, ne bis in idem) to the Court 
of Justice – in its various articulations – as well as 
to the judges in the Member States when they 
apply EU legislation. 
More generally, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights represents a major step in the process 
towards a ‘constitutional’ Europe. For the first 
time a clear and complete set of rights protected 
by the EU has been provided to its citizens. The 
Charter is the most modern and richest catalogue 
of rights in the world: some of those listed 
3 Judicial protection and fundamental rights after Lisbon 
By Lucia Serena Rossi* 
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therein are not even included in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The visibility and importance of the Charter is 
witnessed by its influence on courts inside and 
outside the EU. In fact, not only does the ECJ 
constantly refer to it (as happened with around 
thirty rulings so far), also in connection with the 
ECHR; but also the Strasbourg-based Court uses 
the Charter as a means for interpreting the 
ECHR in order to review its own jurisprudence. 
This is striking but reasonable, as the 
EU Member States amount to a large majority of 
Council of Europe membership, which 
encompasses 47 countries.  
The outcome of this parallel process is a mutual 
enrichment of both Courts, which are in quest of 
a constructive dialogue, as showed by the recent 
joint declaration by the two Presidents on 
EU accession to the ECHR. Many courts within 
the Union are also using the Charter to interpret 
domestic laws, sometimes even beyond its scope. 
One can therefore say that the Charter is paving 
the way for a common understanding of 
fundamental rights at all levels in Europe.  
The EU accession to the ECHR – prescribed 
by the Lisbon Treaty and currently under 
negotiation – will undoubtedly be a challenge 
for the EU judicial system, raising problems of 
coordination between the Luxembourg and the 
Strasbourg Courts when an EU act is 
challenged as violating the ECHR. This 
coordination exercise may also offer an 
opportunity to foster dialogue and closer 
cooperation between them. 
The Charter also influences the work of the 
EU institutions. A specific file on compatibility 
with the Charter is attached by the Commission 
to every new draft of EU legislation. Its Legal 
Service must also monitor the modifications to 
proposals made by the EP and/or the Council: 
in this case, however, the task may occasionally 
prove more arduous, as it is not easy to suggest 
further modifications when a political comp-
romise has already been reached.  
An ex post control on the compatibility of EU 
acts is also possible by means of judicial actions 
of annulment or infringement before the ECJ, 
even if – in this last case – the Commission 
would probably be confronted with strong 
political pressures. 
What remains to be seen 
Nevertheless, some grey areas persist. On the 
one hand, the Charter raises expectations that go 
beyond its original scope: it is sometimes 
difficult to explain to ordinary citizens that the 
Charter can be applied to the legislation of the 
Member States only insofar as they implement 
EU law. On the other hand, it is not very clear 
whether previous ECJ jurisprudence applies, 
allowing (or not) the Charter to be enforced also 
when Member States invoke derogations or 
mandatory requirements in order not to apply 
EU law.  
Furthermore, the delimitation stated by the 
Charter between rights (which can offer grounds 
for judicial claims) and principles (that cannot be 
invoked directly in courts) is not always evident.  
Finally, the Charter increases the external 
visibility of the Union through its values. It does 
so not only by imitation – as it can be a model 
also for other integrated regions in the world – 
but also by direct influence, as EU institutions 
are required by the Lisbon Treaty to pursue the 
coherence of external action also by promoting 
our fundamental values.  
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Arrivées 
Philippe Legrain a rejoint le BEPA le 1er février 
en tant que chef de l’équipe “Analysis” et 
conseiller principal sur les questions 
économiques. Auparavant il était journaliste 
indépendant et écrivain se spécialisant sur les 
sujets de gouvernance économique et le contrôle 
des flux migratoires. 
L’équipe “Analysis” accueille également 
Baudouin Regout, qui travaillait auparavant chez 
McKinsey&Company où il était senior fellow et 
partenaire associé, aussi bien que fondateur et 
chef du “McKinsey Global Institute in Europe”. 
Il est conseiller au BEPA depuis février et 
s’occupe de sujets économiques, bancaires et 
financiers. 
Enfin, Pierre Goudin, expert national détaché du 
Ministère français de l'économie, des finances et 
de l’industrie a rejoint l'équipe “Outreach” du 
BEPA au début février en tant que conseiller et 
suivra le dossier sur le marché intérieur. 
Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à ses nouveaux 
membres. 
Evénements 
Le 1er février, une table ronde entre le Président 
Barroso, les conseillers spéciaux des 
Commissaires (qui se réunissaient en tant que 
groupe pour la première fois) et des 
fonctionnaires européens de haut niveau a eu lieu 
à Bruxelles. L’objectif de la réunion était de 
discuter de questions clés d’actualité face à 
l’Union européenne, en mettant l’accent sur le 
cadre financier pluriannuel et la crise 
économique actuelle.  
Dans le cadre de son programme “Outreach”, le 
BEPA a préparé la visite du Président Barroso à 
Londres à la mi-février pour des rencontres clés 
avec des décideurs et des formateurs d’opinions 
britanniques. M. Barroso a eu une réunion 
bilatérale avec le Premier ministre Cameron, s’est 
entretenu avec l’archevêque de Cantorbéry à 
Lambeth Palace et les principaux laboratoires 
d’idées à Londres, et a donné le discours Alcuin 
à l’Université de Cambridge. 
A l’occasion du premier anniversaire de l’entrée 
en fonction de la Commission Barroso II, le 
BEPA en collaboration avec le service juridique 
de la Commission et en coopération avec la 
Direction Générale de l’Education et de la 
Culture, a organisé une conférence intitulée 
“Implementing the Lisbon Treaty” à Bruxelles 
les 9-10 février 2011. L’objectif de l’événement 
était de débattre des implications potentielles de 
la mise en œuvre du nouveau traité pour le 
processus d’intégration européenne. Parmi les 
nombreuses personnalités distinguées présentes, 
on comptait la participation du Président 
Barroso ; des Commissaires Šefčovič, Reding et 
Vassiliou ; du secrétaire d’Etat polonais aux 
affaires européennes et de la politique 
économique Dowgielewicz ; de la secrétaire 
d’Etat au Ministère fédéral de la justice 
Grundmann ; du président de la Cour 
européenne de justice Skouris ; des membres du 
Parlement européen et des universitaires. 
Le Groupe européen d’éthique (GEE) du BEPA 
a tenu sa 1ère réunion les 8-9 février à Bruxelles, 
en présence du Président Barroso et de 
Margaritis Schinas, le chef adjoint du BEPA. 
L’objectif était de discuter avec le Président de la 
Commission de questions relatives aux travaux 
futurs du Groupe. Le 23 février, le GEE a 
également organisé et présidé la 13e réunion du 
groupe inter-services qui portait sur l’éthique et 
les politiques de l'UE et qui a rassemblé 
18 services de la Commission. Cette réunion 
visait à fournir au BEPA des points d’entrée et 
des thèmes possibles pour la préparation de 
futurs Avis du GEE qui seront soumis au 
Cabinet du Président Barroso. 
Le 11 février, le BEPA a organisé une réunion de 
réflexion sur la question de l’équité 
intergénérationnelle. Les débats ont abordé 
quatre sujets: l'éducation, la santé et la protection 
sociale ; la durabilité et l'efficacité des 
ressources ; une gouvernance efficace ; et une 
croissance intelligente, inclusive et durable. 
Le BEPA a organisé également le même jour un 
débat sur le thème “Transatlantic 2020” 
rassemblant des conseillers du BEPA, des 
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membres du Service d’action extérieure et des 
experts de laboratoires d’idées américains et 
européens. L’objectif de la réunion était 
d’examiner les tendances fondamentales 
sociétales, économiques, politiques et de sécurité 
qui toucheront l’Europe et les États-Unis au 
cours de la prochaine décennie, tout en essayant 
de discerner ce que ces tendances pourraient 
signifier pour le partenariat transatlantique d’ici 
2020 et recommander des options politiques 
pouvant orienter ces tendances. 
Le 16 février, Jean-Claude Thébault, le directeur 
général du BEPA, représentait le Président 
Barroso pour assister, depuis le Port spatial 
européen (Kourou, Guyane française) au 200ème 
vol d'Ariane. Ariane 5 a lancé avec succès le 
second ATV (Automated Transfer Vehicle), 
Johannes Kepler, de l'Agence spatiale 
européenne (ESA). La mission de l’ATV est 
d’assurer le ravitaillement de la Station Spatiale 
Internationale et les manœuvres de rehaussement 
de son orbite. Cet événement exceptionnel 
marque une avancée remarquable pour l’Europe 
de l’espace. 
Activités à venir 
Le BEPA organise le 9 mars un dîner de 
rencontre et de discussion entre le Président 
Barroso et le lauréat du prix Nobel en sciences 
économiques en 2010, le Professeur Christopher 
Pissarides. La Commissaire Vassiliou chargée de 
l’éducation, de la culture, du multilinguisme et de 
la jeunesse ; le Commissaire Rehn chargé des 
affaires économiques et monétaires ; le 
Commissaire Andor chargé de l’emploi, des 
affaires sociales et et de l’inclusion ; le directeur 
général du BEPA, Jean-Claude Thébault et le 
conseiller de haut niveau du Président de la 
Commission sur les questions économiques 
Antonio Cabral participeront au dîner et à 
l’échange de vues sur le renforcement du marché 
du travail et des possibilités de sortie de la crise 
financière. 
Le lendemain, 10 mars, le BEPA organise le 
20ème Séminaire Jacquemin, qui portera sur 
“Employment policies in times of crisis; the 
options” et qui sera présenté par le lauréat du 
prix Nobel en économie Pissarides. Les 
séminaires Jaquemin sont destinés à fournir un 
forum réunissant des membres du personnel de 
la Commission qui sont intéressés par les 
tendances et développements économiques 
actuels, et abordent les problèmes majeurs de 
micro-économie liés aux travaux de la 
Commission. 
Le Président Barroso interviendra dans 
l'événement intitulé “The Europe 2020 Summit: 
an action plan for the post-crisis world”, 
organisé par The Lisbon Council le 15 mars. Ce 
congrès a pour objectif d’animer un débat qui se 
veut axé sur les solutions possibles portera sur 
l’avenir économique et social de l’Europe. 
Le Président Barroso participera le 17 mars à la 
conférence de lancement du programme pilote 
européen pour l’innovation sociale, organisée par 
la DG Entreprise en liaison avec le consortium 
SIX-Louise, chargé du développement du 
programme. Cet évènement réunira à Bruxelles 
environ 150 “créatifs” parmi lesquels des 
entrepreneurs sociaux, des banques coopératives, 
des acteurs et actrices de la société civile, du 
monde des affaires et du secteur public aux 
niveaux national, régional et local.  
